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ABSTRACT
With the introduction of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) in 2004, GNSS became a cornerstone for traffic situation
assessment in the maritime domain. In this paper we study the impact of GNSS jamming on AIS and explore means of compen-
sating potential AIS outages by fusing AIS with a GPS independent sensor such as radar. An IMM-JPDA filter was designed for
multi-target tracking in presence of radar measurements originating from clutter. To demonstrate the working principle of the
proposed scheme a dedicated measurement campaign was conducted in the Baltic Sea. In total three vessels were involved, two
of them performing highly dynamic maneuvers at sea with the third vessel being anchored in the center of these maneuvers. This
static vessel did not only monitor the scene by her radar, but was also equipped with a commercial high power GPS jammer.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, the need for an accurate and resilient maritime traffic situation assessment (MTSA) has been increasingly
growing due to a variety of reasons: the ever increasing global trade constantly calls for ships greater in size and numbers,
considering that about 80% of the traded goods are traversed via sea [1]. Simultaneously, potential threats to the security at sea,
such as piracy or terrorism have become an undoubted risk to secure and efficient shipping along the international waterways
and harbors. In addition, it is a stringent necessity to detect abnormal vessel behavior, to prevent harm to humans and nature.
Migrant vessels or illegal fishing activities are merely two prominent examples. The dominating source for situation assessment
in the maritime domain has been and will be the marine radar, which is still the primary sensor for collision avoidance. However,
with the introduction of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) in 2004 by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
a giant leap was taken towards an improved TSA. The AIS can be understood as supplemental service allowing vessels to
exchange dynamic, static and voyage related data among each other via VHF broadcasting channels. The dynamic AIS message
essentially contains the vessel’s position, course over ground (COG) and speed over ground (SOG), all obtained from an internal
or attached GPS receiver. Besides the intentional abuse of its cooperative nature, being analyzed in [2], the dependency on
an external system like GPS is also a potential threat to the functioning of AIS. In fact, the phenomenon of GNSS jamming
would heavily affect the system’s reliability. In contrast to the common approach of counteracting GNSS jamming at the receiver
side, we propose in this work to mitigate the effects by fusing the AIS data with a sensor of complementary nature, the radar.
This approach exploits the typical behavior of the AIS to switch to default values in case the positions cannot be obtained from
GPS. Additionally, a more robust traffic situation picture can be realized without the requirement for any additional on-board
equipment. In the literature various approaches have been published to augment maritime surveillance or collision avoidance
systems, mostly based on fusing radar with additional sensors like laser in [3] or with multiple radars for exploiting aspect
angle diversity as in [4]. The matter of AIS and radar fusion was mainly addressed for anomaly detection, e.g., based on multi
hypothesis tests in [5] or by exploiting historical traffic route knowledge for Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)/AIS fusion in [6].
Within these approaches either the associations between AIS and radar targets are assumed to be known or non-real time SAR
imagery is incorporated for large scale maritime surveillance. In contrast to that, we propose to treat each AIS message and radar
image frame as individual measurement input to a multi-sensor, multi-target tracking framework yielding target state estimates
for the current time. Consequently, individual sensor outages, e.g., from AIS due to GNSS jamming, can be compensated
much better in case the other sensor is still capturing the target motion in its measurement domain. The challenge of multi-
target tracking (MTT) in the presence of clutter measurements has been addressed in numerous frameworks, roughly divided in
families of enumerative and non-enumerative algorithms. The former explicitly evaluates data associations ranging from rather
simple Nearest Neighbor (NN) association rules to more complex schemes such as Joint Probabilistic Data Association (JPDA) or
Multi Hypothesis Tracking (MHT), with both being well-described in [7] and [8], respectively. The research on non-enumerative
algorithms also led to the introduction of Random Finite Set (RFS) theory to MTT, such as Probability Hypothesis Density (PHD)
or Cardinalized PHD (CPHD) filtering as described in [9] and [10]. Considering the given challenge of on-board fusion of two
sensors, i.e., radar and AIS, with multiple but a limited number of targets to be tracked, the JPDA framework was chosen as
it promises to provide good performance at fair complexity in comparison to NN and MHT algorithms [11]. However, an
additional challenge to the tracking task was identified in the wide range of target dynamics to be expected in the maritime
world. In principle, vessels are either undergoing straight path or turn-maneuver motion, whereas the maneuverability itself
highly depends on the type of vessel. In fact, a single motion model with no additional control input will hardly be able to follow
a target with rapidly changing dynamics. A common way to deal with these challenges is to deploy an Interacting Multiple
Model (IMM) filter, first described in [12], which is tracking the state of a single target by running a bank of Kalman Filters in
parallel, each being conditioned on a different motion model. The IMM filter provides a scheme to combine the outputs of the
individual trackers in a probabilistic sense. The coupling of both algorithms, that is the IMM with the JPDA, was first presented
in [13], whereas [14] also considered the use of multiple sensors in a combined framework.
The remaining document is structured as follows. At first, the methodology for multi-target tracking using multiple sensors in the
presence of clutter measurements will be depicted in more detail. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the results obtained
from applying the designed filter to real-world measurement data, which captured different challenges such as strong Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference and fast maneuvering targets. The paper is concluded including an outlook to
future work in the last section.
FUSING AIS WITH RADAR IN AN MTT FRAMEWORK
The main objective in this work is to present a methodology yielding a robust and complete picture of the current traffic situation
despite outages of individual sensors such as AIS. Plainly speaking, traffic situation assessment mainly deals with the challenge
of detecting and tracking all objects in a certain area of interest, which is generally referred to as multi-target tracking. By
incorporating data from multiple sensors with complementary characteristics the overall tracking is expected to be more robust
against individual sensor failure. In this section the applied MTT framework, an IMM-JPDA filter, will be presented in more
detail, also depicting the procedure for target candidate extraction from radar images.
General dynamic and measurement model
For tracking vessels of various types, we assume to propagate the state vector xtk−1 of the t
th target to the next time frame k
through a non-linear motion model following the notation of
xtk|k−1 = f
i(xtk−1,ε
q
k), (1)
where εqk ∼N
(
0,Σ=Qik
)
and no further control input given. To distinguish between different dynamic models in the upcoming
sections, we introduce the superscript i to the non-linear function f i(·). The predicted state estimate xtk|k−1 will be corrected by
evaluating the residual between the actual measurement zsk of sensor s associated to the t
th target and the predicted measurement
for that sensor following the general formulation of
zˆsk|k−1 = h
s(xtk|k−1,ε
r
k), (2)
with εrk ∼ N
(
0,Σ= Rsk
)
. In the remainder of this section, we will define the set of dynamic and measurement models that
constitute the IMM-JPDA framework for multi-sensor, multi-target tracking.
IMM-JPDA framework using UKF
Considering the inherent trade-off between complexity and tracking performance the JPDA framework was chosen, being com-
bined with an IMM filter to capture different target dynamics. Being first introduced in [15], the JPDA filter is subject to several
assumptions. Most importantly for our application, the finite set of targets to be tracked is assumed to be known, i.e., neither
track initialization nor track pruning is covered by the standard formulation of JPDA. These restrictions, however, are tolerable
in our specific case of fusing radar target candidates with vessels visible in AIS. In fact, the number of targets to be tracked as
well as their initial states are known from AIS within the considered measurement scenario. The key feature of the JPDA is the
computation of conditional probabilities of joint association events
A(k) =
M⋂
j=1
A jt(k), (3)
with respect to the current time k, in which A jt(k) represents the event of the jth measurement originating from target t, with
1≤ j ≤M and 0≤ t ≤ N. In this context, M refers to the number of measurements at time k, N to the number of known targets
and t j is the target index the jth measurement is associated to. With t = 0 the specific case of a measurement originating from
clutter is also being considered. This means, in contrast to a simple NN association rule, the JPDA also accounts for situations
in which a single measurement can be assigned with a certain likelihood to multiple targets at the same time. In order to trace
the different joint association events one usually constructs feasibility matrices Fi; a set of binary matrices of dimensionality
M× (N+1), with the first column index referring to the clutter origin. Such a matrix is subject to the following constraints:
1. A measurement can only originate from either clutter or a single target.
2. A target may be the origin of only one measurement at maximum, whereas the number of measurements originating from
clutter is not limited to one.
These rules are typically expressed in the measurement and target association indicators τ j(A(k)) and δt(A(k), defined as
τ j(A(k)) =
{
1, t j ≥ 1
0, t j = 0
, δt(A(k)) =
{
1, t j = t for some j
0, t j 6= t for all j
.
Using Bayes’ rule, the final expression for the probability of a joint event A given all measurements up to time k is given as
P{A(k)|Zk}= 1
c∏j
{λ−1 ft j [z j(k)]}τ j∏
t
{(Ptd)δt (1−Ptd)1−δt}. (4)
Note, that the definition above is only valid for the parametric version of the JPDA in which the probability mass function (pmf)
of the number of false (or clutter) measurements is modeled as Poisson distribution that depends on λ , i.e., the spatial density
of false measurements. The probability of a target to be detected by a given sensor is expressed in Ptd ; we omit the superscript
t for the remainder of this work, assuming a constant target detection probability per sensor. Details can be found in [15] and
[7]. In case the measurement j is assigned to target t, the corresponding likelihood ft j [z j(k)] in Eq. 4 is obtained from a normal
distribution
ft j [z j(k)] =N [z j(k); zˆt j(k|k−1),St j(k)], (5)
that is set up around the predicted sensor measurement zˆt j(k|k−1) and its covariance St j(k). The factor 1/c in Eq. 4 is a mere
normalization constant.
It can easily be seen that the considerations of all joint events results in a combinatoric growth in complexity for more measure-
ments and more targets. To narrow down the initial set of feasibility matrices a validation matrix V is usually computed first,
which is also a binary matrix of dimensionality M× (N+ 1) representing all possible associations between measurements and
targets. If the single matrix element vmt is either set to 0 or 1 depends on classical validation gating, i.e., the condition of
[z j(k)− zˆt j(k|k−1)]TS−1t j (k)[z j(k)− zˆt j(k|k−1)]< γ. (6)
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Figure 1: Simplified block diagram of the IMM filter running two UKFs conditioned on either a CV or CTRV dynamic model.
Prior to each prediction-correction cycle the initial conditions of the individual UKFs are updated. The sensor measurement zk
is inferred to each of the filters to update the predicted target state. Based on the target state estimates (i.e., their mean xik and
covariance Pik) and the corresponding likelihoods Λ
i
k, with i ∈ {CV,CTRV}, the model probabilities µ ik are updated. In the last
stage, the combined target state estimate, i.e., its mean and covariance, is computed.
needs to be fulfilled for vmt to become 1. Similar to Eq. 5 the volume V of this gate depends on the covariance S−1t j (k) of the
predicted measurement. Despite this pre-selection of possible association events, various additional flavors of the JPDA filter
were introduced aiming at the reduction of combinatoric complexity (see [11] for a comprehensive comparison).
In this work, we use an extension to classical JPDA filtering known as IMM-JPDA filter. The IMM was introduced by [12] to
adopt to quickly changing target dynamics by considering a finite set of kinematic models that run in parallel. In contrast to
hard switching schemes, the IMM weighs the different target state estimates based on the likelihood of each model to explain the
current measurement data. The mode transition is thereby governed by an underlying Markov chain. The application of IMM
filtering to maritime target tracking has already been shown to be beneficial in [16]. In our case, we consider a set of two dynamic
models to capture either straight path or turning maneuver based motion. For the former a Constant Velocity (CV) model was
designed, whereas the Constant Turn Rate Velocity (CTRV) model is supposed to fit best to the latter. The corresponding target
state vectors are defined as
xCVk =
[
pe,k, pn,k, ψk, vk
]T
, xCTRVk =
[
pe,k, pn,k, ψk, vk, ψ˙k
]T
, (7)
with {pe,k, pn,k} being the 2D position coordinates in the local ENU frame, ψk the course over ground, vk the speed over ground
and ψ˙k the turn rate at time k. The uncertainty within the models is expressed in
QCVk =
[
σ2ψ 0
0 σ2v
]
, QCTRVk =
[
σ2v 0
0 σ2ω
]
. (8)
The detailed definitions of the process models f i(·) for CV and CTRV can be found in [17]. In many applications it can be
beneficial to parameterize the different models in such a way that one acts more conservatively than the other. Applied to our
case, the CV model is set to adopt to changes very slowly, i.e. the variances in QCVk are rather small. Vice versa, more uncertainty
is allowed to the CTRV yielding a model more flexible to rapid changes. Additionally, careful attention needs to be paid to the
augmentation of state vectors of different dimensions. In this paper we follow a strategy described in [18] for unbiased mixing
of different process models. In contrast to the common formulation of either IMM or JPDA, which both use Extended Kalman
Filtering (EKF) to adopt to non-linearities in the dynamic models, we deploy the Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) instead (see
[19]). It turns out that due to the sigma point sampling approach the UKF is more robust against non-linearities induced by
the radar measurement update equation, whereas the approximation to a first-order Taylor series expansion within the EKF was
found to diminish its performance (see [4] for discussion). Figure 1 depicts the plain IMM filter for a single sensor measurement
update and two UKFs running in parallel for tracking a single target. The combination of IMM and JPDA filtering schemes to
a well-defined framework was initially proposed by [12] and extended to the multi-sensor case in [14]. In the end, a recursive
step-by-step algorithm was derived fusing the asynchronous measurements from different sensors sequentially. The final state
update equation for the tth target tracked in mode i ∈ {CV,CTRV} becomes
xt,ik = β
i
0tx
t,i
k|k−1+
Mt,k
∑
j=1
xt,ik|k( j)β
i
jt , (9)
with Mt,k being the number of validated measurements for target t and x
t,i
k|k( j) the UKF target estimate conditioned on the j
th
measurement at time k. The weights β ijt are interpreted as association probabilities following the convention in [4], with
β i0t = P{none of the measurements is originating from target t} (10)
β ijt = P{the jth measurement origins from target t}. (11)
Target candidate extraction from radar images
In order to fuse radar with AIS position data, target candidates need to be detected and extracted from radar first to feed them to
the filter as measurement updates. The utilized approach to extract radar target information is based on image processing instead
of directly working on the radar signal level. This may introduce additional error sources originating from mapping the radar
target data from signal to image domain, but also yields the advantage of applying the proposed technique to most commercial
radar systems by simply interfacing to the video output. To extract target candidates from the current radar image at time k, the
following procedure is applied:
1. Masking the image to eliminate features of the user interface, e.g., colored heading lines, blob in center, radar information
tables.
2. Conversion of the image from RGB to gray-scale (weighted average from color channels).
3. Blob detection with fixed range settings for convexity, circularity, inertia, size and intensity of expected targets.
4. Each detected target candidate per frame is expressed in range and bearing, relative to the position of the vessel carrying
the radar.
The key aspect in this processing chain is certainly the scale-invariant blob detection to eventually detect target candidates. This
algorithm is well described in the literature and finds many applications in image based target detection and tracking such as
described in [20]. For this work the implementation provided by the OpenCV framework was used [21]. Figures 2a to 2c show
the different radar processing stages.
(a) Original radar image. (b) Image after background subtraction and
gray-scale conversion.
(c) Extracted target candidates (red circles) at
time k after blob detection.
Figure 2: Processing chain for one radar image at time k to extract the target candidates.
The set of extracted radar measurements is defined as Zsk = {z1k , . . . ,zMk }, with the jth measurement vector z jk = [zrk,zbk ]T compris-
ing range and bearing of the target candidate. The state update of xik|k−1 conditioned on the associated radar target measurements
is based on the definition of hs(xik|k−1,ε
r,s
k ) from Eq. 2 given as
hs(xik|k−1,ε
r
k) =
√(pe,k|k−1− pse)2+(pn,k|k−1− psn)2
arctan
(
pn,k|k−1−psn
pe,k|k−1−pse
) +εrk, (12)
for s= radar and with {pse, psn} being the 2D reference coordinates of the radar system in the ENU frame of the tracked vessel.
The sensor uncertainty in range (σr) and bearing (σb) is modeled in
Rradark =
[
σ2r 0
0 σ2b
]
. (13)
AIS target data
A typical AIS data set contains numerous static and dynamic parameters, that are distributed over different AIS message types and
specified in the ITU-R recommendation [22]. The set of dynamic parameters always comprises the vessel position in longitude
and latitude, COG and SOG, but may also contain true heading and rate of turn (ROT) information. To integrate the AIS data to
the tracking process we simply assign the AIS message to the tth target via its unique Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI).
Instead of applying a probabilistic association scheme we set up a validation gate around the predicted target position in the
measurement domain to reject outliers from AIS data. For state correction the AIS coordinates are converted from WGS84 to
the target’s ENU frame that originates at the latest estimated target position in the global ECEF frame. This implies the AIS
measurement vector zk to be defined as [zek,z
n
k ]
T and the corresponding measurement model from Eq. 2 becomes
hs(xtk|k−1,ε
r
k) =
[
pe,k|k−1
pn,k|k−1
]
+εrk, (14)
with s= AIS and the sensor noise in East and North coordinates being captured in
RAISk =
[
σ2p,e 0
0 σ2p,n
]
. (15)
Note, that the update rate of AIS position reports is varying with the vessel’s dynamics (see [22]). This also implies that the AIS
measurements are in principle asynchronous to measurements obtained from radar; we were grabbing images at a rate of 0.5 Hz.
RESULTS FROM AMARITIME GNSS JAMMING EXPERIMENT
In this section we will test the performance of the designed IMM-JPDA filter based on measurement data. As we are specifically
interested in the resilience of the proposed scheme against AIS outages a challenging scenario was chosen involving two fast
maneuvering vessels exposed to a strong GNSS interference.
Measurement campaign setup
In October 2015, a dedicated measurement campaign was conducted for two days in the Baltic Sea covering different scenarios
of interest. The entire setup of the campaign is depicted in Figure 3. For evaluation purposes we selected a 1:15 h long snippet
that exposed a test case of specific interest to us. This scenario can be characterized as follows:
• Three vessels were involved in total
◦ two chartered ships, BALTIC TAUCHER II (offshore supply vessel) and AARON (tug vessel)
◦ one external ship, NEUSTRELITZ (law enforcement vessel)
• BALTIC TAUCHER II performed highly dynamic maneuvering trials, being additionally equipped with an on-board multi-
frequency, multi-constellation GNSS receiver.
• AARON was anchored monitoring her proximity by her radar.
• AARON also acted as interferer to GPS carrying two common-off-the-shelf GNSS jammers, so-called Personal Privacy
Devices (PPDs).
Note, that the NEUSTRELITZ was not under guidance by any of our team members, as she just entered the scene on her own
behalf. This also implies that in contrast to the BALTIC TAUCHER II we were not able to generate a reference trajectory for the
NEUSTRELITZ, due to the lack of high precision position data. For that reason, we can only test our algorithm on a qualitative
scale, focusing on track completeness and the ability to separate targets. However, a quantitative measure for performance
evaluation based on a metric, e.g., the Optimal Subpattern Assignment (OSPA) metric introduced in [23] cannot be given.
Figure 3: The measurement campaign was conducted in the Baltic Sea close to Hiddensee, Germany. Three vessels were
involved, the BALTIC TAUCHER II (B), the AARON (A) and the law enforcement vessel NEUSTRELITZ (N). A SAR image
is integrated showing all tree ships during the campaign.
Impact of GPS jamming on the AIS
Two commercial GNSS jammers were installed on-board the AARON, one low power device interfering only with GPS L1
and L2 band and one high power unit jamming GPS L1, L2, but also GSM and WiFi frequency bands (only GPS bands were
used). The second device was observed to radiate with an output power approximately 10 dB higher than the first jammer. Both
devices are depicted in Figures 4a and 4b. It is worth mentioning that the deployed jammers only affected the content of AIS
messages, i.e., the positions obtained from Global Positioning System (GPS). The AIS transmission within the VHF bands
remained untouched.
(a) Jammer LP. (b) Jammer HP.
Figure 4: Low and high power GPS jammers used in open sea field trials.
In case on-board GPS receivers fail to compute position data due the loss of lock it was questionable how this is treated within
the broadcasted AIS messages. It turns out that the AIS transmitters of the received vessels are switching immediately to default
mode in case the attached GPS receiver fails to provide a new position solution. This means, for the entire time the receiver was
affected by GNSS interference the longitude and latitude information is set to 181 ◦ and 91 ◦. Although these values can easily
be excluded from the fusion process, it also implies that the AIS is rendered useless for the tracking task.
In Figures 5a and 5b the distance between each of the maneuvering vessels to the GNSS jammer is plotted, based on their
transmitted AIS messages. On a second scale the ON/OFF times for both jammers in use are also marked. From these plots two
phenomena become visible:
1. Only the law enforcement vessel NEUSTRELITZ was affected by any of the GNSS jammers, whereas BALTIC TAUCHER
II hardly shows any influence.
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Figure 5: The plots show the distance between each of the vessels to the AARON, i.e., the GNSS jammer, over time (dotted blue
lines). On top of that the ON/OFF times of the low- and high-power devices are also depicted (red and yellow curves).
2. Considering the law enforcement vessel, the GPS outages clearly depend on the distance to the jammer, starting roughly
from 3000 m downwards. However, additional effects like the tilt of the jamming vessel may have caused an interruption
of the Line of Sight (LoS) between maneuvering vessel and jammer (see re-established position solutions between 1560 s
and 1920 s in Figure 5a).
While the second of the above statements is not very surprising, the fact that the equipment of BALTIC TAUCHER II was
not affected by the jammers did not meet the expectations. We can only speculate about the reasons for this: Most likely the
corresponding GPS receiver was not affected due to the specific signal characteristics of the utilized jammers; saw-tooth-like chirp
signals were transmitted. Another possibility would be that the receiver’s antenna was shielded from the interfering signal by the
monkey deck of the ship. Regardless of these considerations, a very challenging scenario was captured for further evaluation of
the proposed tracking scheme imposing not only continuous AIS outages but also false radar measurements to the filter.
Tracking performance
The trajectories of both vessels obtained from AIS measurements are depicted in Figure 6 with red and blue cross markers. The
reference position of AARON being equipped not only with the jammers but also with the observing radar is pictured as ocher
pentagon. In principle, wee see the same plot as in Figure 5, only that the scenario is now transferred to the spatial domain
plotting all accumulated AIS position coordinates over time. The challenge for the IMM-JPDA filter is clearly to overcome
the AIS outages of the red curve by incorporating radar measurements only. All of these measurements accumulated frame
by frame from radar images are depicted in Figure 7. We can clearly identify the two maneuvering target tracks, a cloud of
clutter measurements south-west of the AARON, and at least three nearly static objects that were detected repeatedly at ENU
coordinates ∼ {(−2060m,0m), (0m,1430m), (960m,0m)}. In fact, those three objects were buoys in the surrounding of the
campaign area. The targets within the IMM-JPDA filter were initialized with the first obtained AIS position report being
transmitted from any of the two maneuvering vessels within the considered time frame. Afterwards, the computation of the joint
probabilities were triggered on every new set of radar target candidate measurements, whereas new arriving AIS position reports
were directly associated to the corresponding target as was described above. However, a new iteration of the IMM scheme as
depicted in Figure 1 is triggered on any sensor measurement used for target state update. The parameterization of the filter with
respect to measurement and sensor noise covariances is summarized in Table 1.
The filtered target tracks over the full time span can be observed in Figure 8 plotted again in the spatial domain. Clearly,
two complete tracks were resolved, i.e., neither track coalescence nor flipped track assignments were observed. The two latter
statements are especially important for the time of GNSS jamming, in which only the radar measurements are used to update the
state of target 2 (law enforcement vessel NEUSTRELITZ). During these times of AIS outages the NEUSTRELITZ was passing
the area exposed to a high number of clutter measurements in radar. Remarkably, even under these severe conditions the target
was tracked completely.
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Figure 6: AIS position reports of both maneuvering targets plotted in the ENU frame originating at the global position of the
AARON (ocher pentagon). The AIS target 2 (red marks) clearly exhibits outages during times of GNSS jamming.
−3,000 −2,500 −2,000 −1,500 −1,000 −500 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000−4,000
−2,000
0
2,000
4,000
ENU-E [m]
EN
U
-N
[m
]
AARON
AIS - target 1
AIS - target 2
Radar target candidates
Figure 7: Extracted radar target candidates plotted on top of the AIS position reports. The pitching and rolling of the AARON,
being equipped with the radar system, is not compensated and therefore projected into the target trajectories.
Table 1: Summary of IMM-JPDA filter settings.
(a) Dynamic model dependent settings.
model uncertainty (Q)
CV
σv = 0.01 m/s2,
σψ = 0.01 ◦/s
CTRV
σv = 0.1 m/s2,
σω = 0.1 ◦/s2
(b) Sensor model dependent settings.
sensor uncertainty (R)
AIS
σp,e = 5m,
σp,n = 5m
radar
σr = 50m,
σb = 0.1rad
(c) General JPDA settings.
JPDA type parametric
spatial density λ 10−9
Pd,radar 0.8
(d) IMM transition
probabilities [12].
T=
[
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
]
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Figure 8: Resulting tracks from fusing AIS and radar in the designed IMM-JPDA filter for a multi-target scenario. The AIS
outages due to the jammed GPS signals are clearly compensated in solid blue and green lines (IMM-JPDA track 1 and 2).
Discussion
Due to the lack of reference data no quantitative analysis of the proposed filter was possible within this study. Nevertheless, the
results obtained from the maritime GNSS jamming experiment are already very promising with respect to our main objectives.
Despite continuous AIS outages the filter was able to generate complete tracks for both targets even throughout clutter measure-
ments, i.e., it appears to be more robust to AIS outages. It can be concluded, that the filtered tracks yield a more complete and
reliable picture of the current traffic situation compared to the individual sensors, which was in fact the main intention of this
work. Naturally, there are also some limitations to the proposed scheme, which shall be discussed in the following. First of
all, the overall accuracy of the filtered objects is bounded by the AIS, which is in that respect a magnitude better sensor (see
Table 1b). Again, this is expected and tolerable, since track completeness is of greater interest than track accuracy for maritime
situation awareness. Secondly, the uncertainty in range and bearing within the radar measurement model was set to rather high
values compared to other common-off-the-shelf marine radars. This was done intentionally to compensate for the motion of
the AARON, which had the radar system mounted on her mast top. Despite being anchored, the AARON was still subject to
the motion of the waves, i.e., the assumption of a static system was actually violated. The resulting pitching and rolling of the
AARON, however, is projected onto the trajectories of the maneuvering vessels, as can be seen in the harmonic structure within
the extracted target candidates in Figure 7. In case this motion was measured and compensated, e.g., with an additional inertial
sensor on-board, the radar uncertainty could be tightened to more realistic values. Thirdly, the current framework is not capable
of initializing targets based on radar measurements. This feature would require either the extension of the algorithm by deploying
a classical M/N detection rule or to move to a more generic MTT framework. And last but not least, the applicability of the
standard JPDA filter clearly depends on the scenario; on the number of (clutter) measurements and targets to be tracked to be
precise. In the demonstrated case of only two targets and a rather conservative setting for the radar target extraction procedure
the computation of the joint probabilities is not problematic. However, this may change drastically for different scenarios due to
the combinatoric explosion of association events. Thus, a more generic framework also capable of large scale traffic monitoring
may require different MTT approaches, e.g., following variations of the JPDA or MHT instead.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented an approach to improve the reliability of on-board maritime traffic situation assessment in the presence
of GNSS jamming rendering the maritime Automatic Identification System useless. An IMM-JPDA filter was designed for
multi-target tracking fusing the Automatic Identification System with a single radar. The evaluation of this filter was based on
measurement data obtained from a dedicated maritime GNSS jamming campaign in the Baltic Sea. This field trial included two
maneuvering vessels and one static ship, where the latter carried two GPS jammers and the radar system for traffic monitoring.
Despite AIS outages and radar clutter measurements the filter showed good performance in terms of track completeness and track
separation. The accuracy of the filtered tracks, however, could not have been determined as a consequence to lacking reference
data. In future work we will direct our research towards cooperative schemes for maritime traffic situation assessment aiming
at a network of spatially distributed sensor nodes or vessels, respectively. By exploiting the diverse information within such a
network, e.g., the variety of radar aspect angles, we expect a significant improvement; not only in robustness against threats like
GNSS jamming or intentional misuse of the AIS, but also in the accuracy of the assessed situation picture. In fact, a reliable and
complete situation picture is key to many high level interpretations, such as collision avoidance or anomaly detection.
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